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BANK COMPETITION, DEPOSIT MOBILIZATION, 
AND FINANCIAL CONCENTRATION IN HONDURAS. 
I. The importance of deposit mobilization 
Following the seminal work of Edward S. Shaw and of 
Ronald I. McKinnon, it has become increasingly accepted that 
the financial sector does matter in economic development. l/ 
The contributions of the financial sector to economic growth 
may be associated with the provision of at least four dif-
ferent types of services. '?:../ The first set of services is 
the provision of a universally accepted medium of exchange, 
which reduces the costs of conducting transactions in com-
modity and factor markets, increases the flow of trade and 
market size, and improves the productivity of resources 
through specialization and division of labor, competition, 
and the exploitation of economies of scale and of modern 
technologies. This "monetization" of the economy releases 
resources from the search and bargain process associated 
with barter and, due to greater market integration, in-
creases the efficiency with which resources are allocated. 
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The financial sector also provides services of inter-
mediation between surplus and deficit economic units. Surplus 
units are those with sufficiently abundant resources of their 
own, in comparison to their own "internal" productive and 
investment opportunities, so that they earn low marginal 
rates of return on their assets, as compared to deficit units, 
which possess few resources, relative to their available op-
portunities and could, therefore, if they had access to the 
resources needed to take advantage of those opportunities, 
earn relatively high marginal rates of return. l./ 
In the absence of finance, economic agents are condemned 
to take advantage of their productive opportunities only to 
- -
the extent allowed by their own endowment of resources, while 
in other cases they are forced to invest their excess resources 
in poor marginal "internal" activities. There is no reason 
to expect that those units where savings are generated are 
necessarily those with the best investment opportunities and 
highest growth potential. By making the division of labor 
between savers and investors possible, the financial system 
channels resources to those activities where they can be 
most profitably employed. 
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Through these intermediation services the financial 
system contributes to the elimination of inferior uses of 
resources (that is, it destroys uses with low private and 
social marginal rates of return) as well as to the financing 
of better alternative uses. This may be accomplished to the 
extent to which the financial system offers wealth holders 
financial assets (e.g., bank deposits) that are more at-
tractive forms of keeping wealth than the unprofitable al-
ternatives being eliminated. This, in turn, makes it pos-
sible to transfer, through the intermediary, claims on re-
sources towards those economic units with better productive 
opportunities that otherwise would have not been exploited. 
From this perspective, the financial system offers 
valuable services not only to borrowers (who presumably . 
possess relatively better opportunities), but also to depositors 
(who at the margin only possess inferior alternative uses of 
those funds). The financial system contributes in this way 
to a better allocation of resources, more rapid capital ac-
cumulation, and an improvement in the <:.Uality of the capital 
stock. 
.-·· , 
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Market fragmentation, the small size of transactions, 
the high costs of information, and the uncertainties and risks 
characteristic of poor economies increase transaction costs 
in the financial markets of the low income countries. As a 
result, the returns to savers are low, the total cost of funds 
to borrowers are high, the size of financial markets is small, 
and the volume of funds channelled and the variety of financial 
services provided are reduced. Fragmentation and high tran-
saction costs also imply a large dispersion of the marginal 
rates of return in the economy, a signal of the existence of 
ample unexploited opportunities for an improved allocation of 
resources. Financial progress implies the reduction of these 
transaction costs as well as a reduction of the dispersion 
of marginal rates of return. 4/ 
Thirdly, the financial system also provides reserve 
management services. Most economic units accumulate stores 
of value for emergencies and to take advantage of future 
opportunities. The financial system reduces the costs and 
risks of accumulating these precautionary and speculative 
reserves and, through the provision of "unused lines of credit", 
it reduces the size of the desired stock of reserves, thus 
releasing resources for productive purposes. 
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Finally, the financial system provides services of 
fiscal support for the public sector. This is an important 
contribution, in view of the weakness of the tax structures 
and of the securities markets in the low income countries. 
The financial sector also contributes to the management of 
foreign exchange. 
In summary, economic development in the low incoTie 
countries both depends on and contributes to the growth and 
diversification of the financial sector. Financial deepening 
matters, while several classes of services of the financial 
sector are an important ingredient in the process of growth. 
Credit is important, but deposit mobilization is important too. 
These services contribute to development to the extent that 
they provide incentives for increased savings and investment, 
and encourage savers to hold a larger proportion of their 
wealth in the form of financial assets (e.g., bank deposits), 
rather than in the form of unproductive tangible assets and 
other money substitutes. The rate and character of growth, 
in turn, are influenced by the efficiency of the institutions 
and instruments of the financial sector. That is, the extent 
to which the financial system increases productive capacity 
depends on its real size and on the efficiency of its per-
--
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formance, measured mainly by the magnitude and dispersion 
of the transaction costs imposed on all market participants. 
Financial development ·±n Honduras 
During the 1960s and most of the 1970s Honduras 
experienced a steady and significant process of financial 
deepening. This financial progress was reflected by the 
establishment of numerous financial institutions, the provision 
of a wider range of financial services, and the growth of 
credit volumes and of other financial magnitudes, when 
measured in real terms. In effect, the ratio of the money 
supply, defined in a broad sense as M2 , with respect to the 
Gross Domestic Product, increased from 13.0 in 1960 to 34.9 
in 1978. At the same time, the ratio of domestic credit from 
the banking system with respect to the Gross Domestic Product 
augmented from 11.8 in 1960 to 44.3 in 1978. These ratios 
were comparatively high among low income countries and 
reflected a more rapid pace of financial deepening in Hon-
duras than in the other Central American countries. Thus, 
although Honduras started from the lowest level of financial 
deepening in the region in 1960, it had progressed beyond 
the other countries, with the exception of Costa Rica, by 
the mid-197 Os. 
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Clearly, this process of financial deepening was made 
possible by the absence of inflation and by exchange rate 
stability. Absence of inflation, in turn, resulted from the 
openness of the economy, coupled with a stable exchange rate. 
Exchange rate stability was made possible by cautious, orthodox 
fiscal, credit, and monetary policies, specifically targeted 
to keep the external value of the Lempira constant. 
The provision of a generally accepted means of payments 
has been an important financial service in an economy where 
only recently have large subsistence sectors been progressively 
incorporated to the market economy and monetary transactions. 
Much of Honduras' financial deepening, therefore, can be ex-
plained by the "monetization" of the country's economy. The 
inflationary pressures of the most recent years, however, have 
reduced the efficiency with which the domestic financial sys-
tern can provide this service. This is unfortunate, given the 
extreme openness of the Honduran economy, both on the current 
and the capital accounts of its balance of payments, and given 
the increasing internationalization of financial markets. All 
of this has made easier for domestic economic units to subs-
titute foreign currencies (in particular U.S. dollars) for 
the domestic means of payments. Although Honduras has not yet 
,,· .J-
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experienced a process of "currency substitution" as has been 
the case in other small countries (e.g., Costa Rica), it 
would take only moderate rates of inflation and devaluation 
expectations to induce a "flight from the domestic money" 
which, in turn, would severely limit the ability of the 
domestic financial sector to provide its other valuable 
services. 
This reduced ability of the Honduran financial system 
to provide the set of services required for efficiency and 
growth has resulted from the abuse of its role as fiscal 
support of the public sector. With the stagnation of real 
incomes that has resulted in the early 1980s from the deterior-
ation of the country's international terms-of-trade, the 
world recession, and the exhaustion of the import-subs-
titution strategy and the collapse of the Central American 
Common Market, government revenues have not increased suf-
ficiently to finance rapidly increasing public sector ex-
penditures. Moreover, lenders abroad have placed limits 
on the stock of external debt that finances the accumulated 
deficits of the Honduran government. The authorities, there-
fore, have forced the domestic banking system to finance this 
deficit, leading to an expansion of domestic credit at a rate 
l -
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faster than the rate that would maintain stability of the 
domestic price level and of the exchange rate. At the same 
time, the private sector has been "crowded out" of the domes-
tic credit portfolios, as the share of the public sector 
has increased rapidly, from 19.2 percent in 1977 to 33.8 per-
cent in 1982. Also, the private commercial banks have been 
"crowded out" from Central Bank credit, as the share of the 
public sector has increased from 39.2 percent in 1977 to 66.8 
percent in 1981. Only in 1982 the public sector received 
78.4 percent of the annual increment in domestic credit. ~ 
Given a fixed official exchange rate, the excess sup-
ply of domestic money has been reflected by an excess demand 
for foreign exchange. International monetary reserves have 
been lost, despite large inflows of foreign debt, and import-
and-exchange controls have been imposed, while domestic 
inflationary pressures are evident. In the end, the fiscal 
deficit has been financed by the loss of international 
monetary reserves, by foreign borrowing and assistance, by 
the "crowding out" of the private sector in credit port-
folios, and by the inflation tax, all of which increase finan-
cial repression and have reversed the favorable long-term 
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trend of financial deepening in Honduras. In effect, 
the rates of growth of M1 and of M2 , measured in real terms, 
have been negative for the 1979-1982 period, reflecting a 
reduced willingness of Hondurans to hold domestic monetary 
assets. As a result, the ratio of M2 with respect to the 
Gross Domestic Product dropped from 34.8 in 1978 to 29.5 
in 1982. 
The reduction of the real size of the Honduran f inan-
cial system and the "crowding out" of the private sector 
from domestic credit portfolios have reduced the ability of 
the sector to provide services of intermediation between 
savers and investors (between surplus and deficit units). 
That is, the Honduran financial system has become much less 
of an intermediary between depositors and borrowers and much 
more of a fiscal instrument to tax resources away from 
savers, in order to finance current public sector expenditures. 
This lack of balance in the provision of different classes 
of financial services has significantly reduced the ability 
of the sector to promote economic development and monetary 
stability. 
- ' ... - ~- . 
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Moreover, despite its long-term financial progress, 
Honduras has continued to rely heavily on foreign savings in 
order to finance its domestic investment. Also, financial 
markets remain highly fragmented and only a small propor-
tion of the population has access to credit and to other of 
the new financial services offered. Loan portfolios show a 
high degree of concentration, which seems to have increased 
with the crisis and with the contraction of the real value 
of lending flows. 
In effect, measured in constant Lempiras of 1978, 
the flow of new loans granted by the banking system dropped 
from 1,383 million in 1978 to 928 million in 1981 and 955 
million in 1982. The real value of the flow of new agricul-
tural loans, in turn, declined from 398 million in 1978 to 
187 million in 1981 and 204 million in 1982. As a result, 
the ratio of the flow of new loans with respect to the Gross 
Domestic Product, which had increased from 29.8 in 1971 to 
46.7 in 1977, dropped to 28.7 in 1981. Also, the ratio of 
the annual flow of new agricultural loans with respect to 
value added in this sector, which had increased from 26.7 in 
1971 to 43.4 in 1977, declined to 20.1 in 1981, a value lower 
than that for a decade before. 61 
.-
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This contraction in the real value of credit volumes 
seems to have been accompanied by an even more rapid reduc-
tion in the number of borrowers and by more acute problems 
of recuperation and default than in the past. The resulting 
"freezing" of significant portions of loan portfolios have 
further reduced the availability of loanable funds and 
financial viability. As suggested, lack of access to f inan-
cial services and loan concentration have been particularly 
severe in the rural areas, while the transaction costs im-
posed on all market participants seem to be very high and to 
vary substantially among borrower classes. ?/ 
Financial market structure and regulation 
The financial market of Honduras has been dominated 
by the private commercial banks, a few public development 
banks, and several specialized savings banks ( "instituciones 
especializadas de ahorro", equivalent to savings and loan 
institutions). In this respect, Honduras has not been dif-
ferent from other low income countries, where the liabilities 
of the monetary system account for most of the claims on 
intermediary financial institutions that are held by the 
public and where bank credit is the main source of finance 
• 
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"external" to the firms. For these reasons, the monetary 
and banking system has played a crucial role as an inter-
mediary between savers and investors. 
All of these institutions have been regulated by the 
Central Bank, which has influenced the price of the financial 
services delivered, the entry of new institutions in the 
market, and the types of financial activities in which the 
various classes of institutions can engage. The Central Bank 
has exercised direct price regulation of financial services 
by setting the official exchange rate, ceilings on loan in-
terest rates and commissions, ceilings on the rates to be 
paid on foreign currency deposits, differential rediscounting 
percentages, rates and margins, and differential reserve 
requirements. ~ All of these regulations have had a sig-
nificant impact on bank profitability. Also, ceilings on loan 
interest rates have indirectly imposed a maximum level on the 
rates that can be offered on deposits, while differential 
rediscounting and interest rate structures have further dis-
torted credit allocation, through the rationing processes that 
have resulted from under-equilibrium interest rates. 
14 
Central Bank regulation has also affected the entry of 
new institutions in the formal financial market of Honduras. 
First, entry into the market has required the maintenance of 
a minimum equity capital and proper justification of social 
benefits, in the case of new institutions, and proof of 
feasibility and of social gains for the local conrrnunity, in 
the case of new branches of existing institutions. Banking 
legislation and the Central Bank have also regulated the 
kinds of activities in which different classes of financial 
institutions can participate. In order to protect depositors 
and guarantee the financial soundness of the system, the 
Central Bank has managed reserve requirements and has imposed 
limits on the proportions of total assets that can be directed 
towards particular loans or investments. The Superintendency 
has regularly monitored the financial state of regulated ins-
titutions. 
In addition to the Central Bank, the Honduran financial 
system presently includes fifteen private corrunercial banks, 
two of which are branches of foreign banks (i.e., Banco Atlan-
tida, de Honduras, El Ahorro Hondureno, de Occidente, La Capi-
talizadora Hondurena, de los Trabajadores, del Comercio, Con-
• 
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tinental, Financiera Centroamericana, Sogerin, de las Fuerzas 
Armadas, Mercantil, Hondureno del Cafe, de Londres y Montreal, 
and of America); three public development banks (i.e., Banco 
Nacional de Desarrollo Agricola, known as BANADESA, Banco 
Municipal Autonomo, and Corporacion Nacional de Inversiones, 
known as CONADI); the savings and loan department of the Ins-
titute Nacional de la Vivienda and one public savings bank 
(Financiera Nacional de la Vivienda) as well as six private 
savings banks (La Vivienda, Vivienda de Sula, Casa Propia, 
La Constancia, Futuro, Financiera Metropolitana). 
There are important ownership, directorate, and financial 
links between some of the savings banks and some of the com-
mercial banks, and between these financial institutions and 
non-banking productive enterprises. Several of these ins-
titutions are owned by recognized "financial groups". These 
groups, as well as-the small number of institutions and the 
thin market for specialized financial services have led to the 
hypotheses, sustained by several observers, that substantial 
oligopolistic power is exercised in the Honduran financial 
system. One of the purposes of the present paper is a prelim-
inary exploration of the nature and consequences of the market 
structure of the Honduran financial system and of its effects 
--
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on the ability and willingness of the banks to mobilize 
domestic deposits and to reward savers appropriately. 
Competition and concentration of the financial system 
This paper reports the finding of increasing com-
petition in domestic deposit mobilization by the Honduran 
financial system during the 1971-1982 period. Similar 
improvements in the competitive environment seem to have 
occured during the 1960s too, but those are not measured 
here. This greater degree of competition has been reflected 
by increases in the number of participants in the market, 
by a reduction of the relative importance of the largest 
banks-, and by a generalized expansion of the bank network 
during the period. 
By 1971 eleven private commercial banks and two 
public development banks already participated in the market 
for deposits. Only five of these commercial·banks, however, 
had been created before the 1960s. Banco de Honduras had 
been operating since 1889 and Banco Atlantida, by far the 
largest bank in those days, had been established in 1914. 
Both had enjoyed money-issuing priviledges. During the 1960s 
I 
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several new commercial banks were established, while several 
existing specialized financial institutions (particularly 
some savings and loan institutions) were transformed into 
commercial banks. Between 1971 and 1982, the period under 
study here, five additional commercial banks were created, 
while one of the previously existing ones, Banco Financiera 
Hondurena, failed in 1981. Also, competition for deposits 
by the savings banks augmented during this period, as the 
number of specialized savings institutions increased from 
four in 1971 to eight in 1982. 
This growth of the Honduran banking system, in terms 
of the number of participating institutions, was paralleled 
by the rapid expansion of the number of bank offices. In 
the case of the commercial and development banks, this num-
ber increased from 134 in 1971 to 244 in 1982. This, in 
turn, implied that the average number of off ices increased 
from 10.3 per bank in 1971 to 14.4 per bank in 1982. BANADESA 
increased the number of its branches from 21 in 1971 to 27 
in 1982, accounting for only six of the 110 new branches 
established during the period. The rapid expansion of the 
banking network, therefore, resulted from the decisions of 
the private commercial banks, which created 104 new off ices, 
and of the savings banks. In effect, the number of off ices 
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operated by the savings banks increased from four in 1971 to 
35 in 1982. This represented an increase in the average 
number of offices from one per savings bank in 1971 to 4.4 
per institution in 1982. (See Table 1). 
This rapid expansion of the branch network resulted 
not only from a greater degree of financial deepening, but 
also from the need to rely on non-interest forms of com-
petition in order to capture a larger share of the market 
for deposits. Since competition could not take place in 
the form of explicit interest offerings on deposits, given 
high reserve requirements and the ceilings imposed on loan 
rates of interest by the Central Bank, the existing rivalry 
was expressed in the form of implicit deposit remunerations 
through a greater number of bank off ices. 
These implicit payments, in the form of an expanded 
network and of conveniently located bank off ices, in order 
to increase the clients' access to financial services and 
reduce their transaction costs (transportation and waiting 
time), were meant to partially compensate the depositor for 
the comparatively low rates of interest paid. Moreover, 
given the constraints on profitability implied by the 
I 
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regulations, as well as the predominance of borrower in-
terests in the operation of the system, the larger banks 
attempted to compete for deposits without increasing their 
interest rates to the same levels paid by some of their 
competitors. That is, these large banks attempted to rely 
on their image and prestige, location, and the scope of the 
financial services offered in order to keep their share of 
the market, while paying somewhat lower interest rates on 
deposits. The available evidence seems to suggest that 
depositors, nevertheless, were influenced in their decisions 
by the interest rate differentials and these large banks 
lost part of their share of the market. 
Banco Atlantida, which has operated the largest net-
work of offices, increased the number of its branches from 
36 in 1971 to 53 in 1982. Despite this expansion, however, 
The relative importance of its network declined, from 29.8 
percent of the total number of bank off ices in the system 
(including the commercial and the development banks) in 1971, 
to 22.0 percent of the total in 1982. The relative importance 
of BANADESA, which operates the next largest network, also 
declined, from 17.4 percent of the total number of offices in 
1971 to 11.2 percent of the total in 1982. On the other hand, 
.-
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Banco de Occidente increased its share in the total number 
of branches frofl 5.8 percent in 1971 to 10.8 percent in 1982, 
while Banco Rogerin increased its share from 1.7 percent of 
the total number of bank offices in 1971 to 9.1 percent at 
the end of the period. 
The more rapid expansion of the branch network of some 
of the smaller and newer financial institutions, as well as 
the expansion of the network of the savings banks, has reduced 
the degree of concentration of the branching network in the 
Honduran financial systero, as reflected by standard indexes 
of concentration. One of these is the Herf indahl index of 
concentration, which is obtained as the sum of the squares of 
the shares of all market participants and is frequently used 
to indicate the degree of monopoly power exercised in any mar-
ket. According to this measurement, a market is said to be 
highly concentrated if the index is above 1,800, to be 
moderately concentrated if the index is between 1,200 and 
1,800, and to be unconcentrated if the index is below 1,200. 
From the perspective of the shares of the individual 
banks in the total number of bank branches in the Honduran 
financial system, the Herfindahl index shows a significant 
: 
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reduction in the degree of market concentration between 1971 
and 1982. This index steadily declined from 1,645 in 1972 to 
1,194 in 1980 and 1,248 in 1982. The former figure reflects 
a market that was moderately concentrated, with the index 
closer to the 1,800 level characteristic of highly concentrated 
markets, while the latter figures basically represent a non-
concentrated market. (See Table 2). 
This less concentrated ownership of the branch network 
has been accompanied also by lesser market concentration from 
the perspective of the total assets of the financial system. 
In effect, the share of Banco Atlantida in the total assets 
of the system declined from 23.5 percent in 1971 to 9.9 per-
cent in 1982, while the share of BANADESA in total assets 
declined from 21.2 percent in 1971 to 10.0 percent in 1980 
and then increased to 13.4 percent in 1982. 
The same process of deconcentration can also be observed 
from the perspective of the total volume of demand deposits 
mobilized. The share of the largest bank, Atlantida, declined 
from 33.9 percent of all demand deposits in 1971 to 18.1 per-
cent in 1982, while the share of Banco de Honduras declined 
from 11.4 percent in 1971 to 3.2 percent in 1981 and to 5.0 
percent in 1982. In turn, the share of BANADESA in demand 
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deposits declined from 20.2 percent in 1972 to 7.8 percent 
in 1981 and to 9.3 percent in 1982. These higher shares of 
all the larger banks during 1982, as compared to 1981, are 
a reflection of the failure of the Banco Financiera Hondurena. 
The deconcentration of the market has been even more 
pronounced with respect to savings deposits and time cer-
tificates of deposit. That is, the increase in competition 
during the period has been more acute in the area of interest-
bear ing deposits. The share of Banco Atlantida in the total 
of savings and time deposits declined from 40.0 percent in 
1971 to 16.0 percent in 1982. Moreover, the share of the 
largest four banks, combined, declined from 69 percent of the 
volume of savings and time deposits in 1971 to 46 percent in 
1982. 
Moreover, this reduced concentration of the system has 
been dramatically and conclusively reflected by the corres-
ponding indexes of concentration. The Herf indahl index for 
the Honduran financial system, with respect to total deposit 
mobilization, declined from 1,890 in 1971 to 895 in 1982. 
That is, the market for deposits evolved from one still 
characterized by a high degree of concentration in the early 
1970s, to one that technically speaking is not concentrated 
at all, in the early 1980s. 
: 
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The Herfindahl index for the market for demand deposits 
(checking accounts), which earn no interest, declined from 
1,691 in 1971 to 941 in 1982, also reflecting a movement 
from high concentration to no concentration at all. The 
extent of this improvement, however~ is comparatively smaller 
than in the previous case, given the preference of the larger 
banks to mobilize demand deposits rather than interest-
bearing deposits. A more significant change in market 
structure has been reflected by the Herfindahl index for the 
market for savings and time deposits. In this case, the 
index dramatically declined from 2,166 in 1971 to 874 in 
1982. Not only was this portion of the market highly con-
centrated in the early 1970s, when rates of inflation were 
low and deposit rates positive in real terms, but it has 
become the most competitive portion of the market in the 
early 1980s, as interest rates became negative in real terms, 
the financial system had contracted, and competition for 
funds became more acute. 
It is interesting to note that the share of the savings 
banks in the total deposits of the system increased from 0.3 
percent in 1971 to 4.0 percent by 1978 and further improved 
to 10.3 percent in 1981 and to 8,4 percent in 1982. These 
.-
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increases have been at the expense of the private commercial 
banks, whose share declined from 89.0 percent of total deposits 
in 1971 to 81.5 percent of the total in 1982. The share of 
the public development banks in total deposits, on the other 
hand, only slightly declined from 10.6 percent in 1971 to 
10.l percent in 1982. 
The Honduran banks operate two classes of branches: 
sucursales, which are full-service off ices, where both loans 
are granted and deposits are mobilized, and aqencias, which 
are limited-service offices, where deposits are mobilized 
but loans are not granted. During the 1971-1982 period, the 
limited-service off ices expanded more rapidly than the full-
service branches. As a result, the relative importance of 
the limited-service off ices (deposit mobilization windows) 
increased from 63 percent to 74 percent of the total number 
of off ices, while the relative importance of the full-service 
branches declined from 37 percent in 1971 to 26 percent in 
1982. This suggests that the commercial banks were more 
interested in using their expanding branching network for 
deposit mobilization than for loan portfolio management, so 
competition increased with respect to the market for deposits 
but may not have increased that much in the market for loans. 
• 
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It has already been claimed that in Honduras the rural 
sector has benefited from financial deepening to a lesser ex-
tent than the urban sector. This urban-bias hypothesis seems 
to be confirmed by the data on the concentration of the f inan-
cial system on a regional perspective. That is, although the 
expansion of the branch network has made the financial sector 
more competitive as a whole in the mobilization of deposits, 
it has concentrated these efforts in the urban areas. In ef-
fect, the share of the banking network concentrated in the 
urban areas of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro de Sula increased 
from 57 percent in 1971 to 62 percent in 1982. 
In order to compute the Herf indahl index of concentra-
tion from a regional perspective, an operational region was 
defined as a region where at least one full-service off ice 
operated at any one point in time during the period. This 
Herfindahl index increased from 1,862 in 1971 to 2,097 in 
1982. That is, from the perspective of the number of banking 
offices operating in a region, the distribution of branches 
in Honduras is highly concentrated and this degree of con-
centration increased during the period. This phenomenon in 
part reflects the increasing urban concentration observed in 
general as well as the rationing criteria used by the banks. 
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When only full-service offices are considered, the 
network can be said to have been moderately concentrated 
from a regional perspective. However, as was the case in 
general, the Herfindahl index of concentration increased 
during the period, from 1,536 in 1971 to 1,658 in 1982. 
These measures of concentration consider the location of 
different branches only and do not reflect the concen-
tration of lending activity, in terms of credit volumes. 
It is not surprising to find that, when only limited-
service branches are considered, the market was highly 
concentrated from a regional perspective. This is a reflec-
tion of the proliferation of deposit-windows in the urban 
areas. In this case, the Herfindahl index increased from 
2,154 in 1971 to 2,271 in 1982. That is, the increase in 
competition for deposits took place mostly in existing and 
easy-to-service markets, mainly in the urban centers of 
Tegucigalp~ and San Pedro de Sula. The proportion of limited-
service branches in these two cities remained at 62 percent 
throughout the period. In the urban areas transaction costs 
were low both for depositors and for the intermediary. As 
a result, the rural areas have not been provided with deposit 
mobilization services that, as previously discussed, are also 
an important ingredient of the package of services to be 
offered by a complete financial system. 
• ' .I.. 
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Despite increased competition and the other sig-
nif icant changes in market structure that took place 
during the period, the restrictions on interest rates as 
an incentive to depositors severely limited the ability of 
the banks to increase the real value of their total 
deposits. While in real terms, demand deposits had grown 
at an average rate of 1.2 percent per quarter during 
1970-1974 and of 2.0 percent per quarter during 1974-1978, 
they declined at an average rate of -1.0 percent per 
quarter during 1979-1981. Similarly, savings deposits, 
that had increased at average quarterly rates of 1.9 per-
cent and 2.7 percent during the 1970-1974 and 1974-1978 
periods, declined at an average rate of -1.3 percent per 
quarter during 1979-1981. Finally, time deposits, that 
had grown very fast, at rates of 3.8 percent and 4.5 per-
cent per quarter during 1970-1974 and 1974-1978, also 
declined, at an average quarterly rate of -2.2 percent. 9! 
In order to maintain the real value of their loanable 
funds in the presence of declining deposit mobilization, and 
in order to sustain their prof it levels, the banks induced 
important changes in the structure of their assets and 
liabilities. Particularly noticeable is the increase in the 
banks' risk exposure during the 1971-1982 period. This in-
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crease in risk exposure has been reflected by important 
increments in the leveraqe multiplier of the banking system 
as a whole, which is defined as the ratio of the banks' total 
assets with respect to their equity capital. For the whole 
financial system this leverage· multiplier increased from 7.5 
in 1971 to 16.8 in 1980, but then declined to 13.1 in 1982. 
This declined. was explained in part by the failure of one of 
the important banks in 1981 and by the generalized contrac-
tion of the real size of the Honduran financial system that 
has characterized its evolution during the recent crisis. 
Access to Central Bank rediscounting and to foreign 
funds also allowed the commercial and, particularly, the 
development banks, to expand their portfolio of assets with-
out having to emphasize domestic deposit mobilization. That 
is, the ratio of total assets of the system with respect to 
total deposits mobilized increased from 1.96 in 1971 to 2.98 
in 1979 and then declined to 2.63 in 1982, as Central Bank 
financing and foreign borrowing were restricted. Comparatively 
poor deposit mobilization, in comparison to asset expansion, 
has resulted in the relative stability of the deposit mul-
tiplier, which ranged between 3.81 in 1971 and 5.99 in 1980. 
The 1982 level of the deposit multiplier, of 4.99, was similar 
to the 1972 level, of 4.59. 
f 
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The expansion of the portfolio of assets through 
higher leverage multipliers has varied much from bank to 
bank. In 1971 the leverage multiplier ranged between 4.0 
and 27.9 for the private commercial banks, while it was 
3.8 for BANADESA. In 1982, the leverage multiplier ranged 
between 6.6 (for a recently created bank) and 29.8, with 
the exclusion of the subsidiary of a foreign bank, which 
showed a multiplier of 96.0. It had increased to 21.7 in 
1981 for BANADESA, but then dropped to 6.3 in 1982, as 
this bank was recapitalized. 
The distribution of Central Bank credit has changed 
significantly. In 1971 BANADESA received 92 percent of 
the Central Bank's direct assistance. This proportion had 
declined to 34 percent by 1980 and represented 53 percent 
in 1982. In 1980 Banco Financiera Hondurena, about to fail, 
received 20 percent of the Central Bank direct assistance. 
During the most recent years the Central Bank has had to 
help three small but rapidly expanding banks to meet their 
capital adequacy standards and prevent them from failing. 
These three banks have received 31 percent and 27 percent 
of direct Central Bank assistance in 1981 and 1982. These 
funds have represented up to 25 percent of their assets. 
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Similarly important changes have taken place on the 
asset side of the financial system's balance sheet. In the 
first place, the proportion represented by cash and reserves 
has increased, in the case of the private commercial banks, 
from 14.3 percent of total assets in 1971, to 19.5 percent 
in 1982. This increase has been cause~, mostly, by the 
proportion represented by the holdirtgs of public sector 
securities, as reserve requirements have been increased, 
but the banks have been allowed to hold public sector 
securities to satisfy the requirements. These public 
sector securities represented only 4.6 percent of total 
assets in 1971, but their relative importance increased to 
11.9 percent in 1982. This is just another manifestation 
of the greater fiscal role that the banking system has been 
asked to play. 
On the other hand, there has been a long-term trend 
for the relative importance of the loan portfolio to decline. 
Loans represented 59.7 percent of the total assets of the 
whole financial system in 1971, but their relative importance 
had declined to 37.9 percent by 1979, as inflationary expec-
tations increased. In recent years, the share of loans in 
' -
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• total assets has experienced some recuperation, to represent 
43.4 percent in 1982. In the particular case of the private 
commercial banks, the share of loans in total assets declined 
from 49.9 percent in 1973 to 35.4 percent by 1980, but also 
recuperated to 42.2 percent in 1982. These data suggest that 
the commercial banks have moved away from lending and into 
holding other forms of investment, like real estate, tangible 
assets and foreign assets, that serve as inflation hedges or 
are less risky than loans, and into holding more government 
debt, as a conseauence of the fiscal crisis. The reduction 
of the relative importance of the loan portfolio may also 
reflect the impact of loan rate ceilings, coupled with high 
lending costs. In all of these cases, the role of the finan-
cial system as a provider of intermediary services between 
surplus and deficit units has been jeopardized. 
In summary, the Honduran financial system has actively 
competed for deposits, on the basis of non-interest rewards 
to savers, reflected by the rapid expansion of the branching 
infrastructure, particularly in the urban centers. Interest 
rate restrictions, however, have both induced too much access 
to Central Bank and foreign funds, and may have also contributed 
to the still highly concentrated distribution of loan port-
folios in Honduras. 
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Table 1. Honduras: Number of bank offices, average number of offices per bank 
and proportion of full-service and limited-service branches. 
1971-1982. 
Number of off ices Off ices per bank Percentage of off ices 
Year Banks* Savings banks Banks* Savings banks Full-service Limited-, 
1971 134 4 10. 3 1.0 .37 . 63 
1972 147 5 11.3. 1.2 • 3 5 .65 
1973 159 5 12.2 1.2 .33 • 67 
1974 174 5 11.6 1.2 • 3 2 .68 
1975 182 6 12.1 1.5 .31 .69 
1976 194 9 12.9 1.8 • 3 0 • 7 0 
1977 205 9 13.7 1.8 .29 .71 
1978 217 11 14.5 1.8 .28 .72 
1979 228 18 14.3 2.2 .27 .73 
1980 246 27 14.5 3.4 .26 .74 
1981 244 32 14.4 4.0 .26 .74 
1982 244 35 14.4 4.4 • 2 6 .74 
* Includes both private coP1P1.ercial and public development banks. The percentage 
of off ices of the last columns are referred to these banks only. 
Source: Computed from Central Bank information on the number of offices operated 
by the financial institutions under its regulation. 
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Table 2. Honduras: Herfindahl index of concentration, for 
the number of off ices, total deposits, demand 
deposits, and savings and time deposits, per 
institution, in the financial system. 1971-1982. 
Number of Total Demand Savings and 
Year off ices deposits deposits time deposits 
1971 1,635 1,890 1~691 2,166 
1972 1,645 1,535 1,440 1,922 
1973 1,621 1,467 1,411 1,817 
1974 1,482 1,436 1,384 1,848 
1975 1,490 1,475 1,375 1,722 
1976 1,424 1,222 1, 070 1,495 
1977 1,361 1,093 980 1,298 
1978 1,337 1,072 1,074 1,117 
1979 1,273 1,071 1,159 1,040 
1980 1,194 1,005 1,038 1,029 
1981 1,271 962 941 1,000 
1982 1,248 895 986' 874 
· Source: Computed on the basis of balance sheet data published 
in Banco Central de Honduras, Boletin Estadistico, 
several years. 
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Table 3. Honduras: Number of BANADESA offices, proportion 
of bank off ices in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro de 
Sula and regional Herf indahl indexes of concentra-
tion, 1971-1982. 
II • 
• 
Number of Proportion of Herf indahl Index of Concentration* 
BANADESA urban bank Total Full- Limited-
Year off ices off ices* off ices -service service 
1971 21 .57 1,862 1,536 2,154 
1972 21 .57 1,867 1,488 2,155 
1973 22 .56 1,833 1,442 2,083 
1974 22 .58 1,887 1,461 2,124 
1975 22 .58 1,885 1,477 2,106 
1976 22 .58 1, 914 1,507 2,122 
1977 26 .60 2,011 1,575 2,221 
1978 27 .61 2,053 1,575 2,265 
1979 27 • 61 2,081 1,607 2,318 
1980 27 • 62 2,093 1, 638 2,276 
1981 27 .62 2,097 1,657 2,271 
1982 27 .62 2,097 1,657 2,271 
* It is the proportion of branches of the commercial and 
development banks that are located in Tegucigalpa and San 
Pedro de Sula. The Herfindahl index of concentration has 
been computed from a regional perspective, as explained 
in the text. 
Source: The same as in Tables 1 and 2. 
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,. Table 4. Honduras: Financial sector multipliers. 1971-1982. i 
• 
Leverage Deposits Ratio of assets 
Year multiplier multiplier to deposits 
1971 7.45 3.81 1.96 
1972 8.66 4.59 1.87 
1973 9.66 5.04 1.92 
1974 10. 41 4.87 2. 07 
1975 10. 34 3.92 2.63 
1976 11.74 4.65 2.52 
1977 14.22 5.31 2.68 
1978 15.04 5.59 2.69 
1979 16.34 5. 4 9 2,98 
1980 16. 79 5.99 2,80 
1981 16.21 5.76 2,81 
1982 13.13 4.99 2.63 
Source: The same as in the previous tables. 
